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THE LUFTWAFFE ON THE EASTERN FRONT
By GENERAL QUADE
J£~r!l d"y eime tile ouibreak oj tile Gum'... ·So"id WIlT. Ih~ coml1l,miq,cU oj
Ihe G_ Higit CommOfm #lave mentiolled the uploi'" oj tile LuJtwaJJe on Ihe
~a"'~ front. It U etridenI to WIlTyOnIl that the "hare oj the IAlJhlJ(,Jfe in tile Gennan
L;ctortu oj tile pa8l eiglllun montlla heu been very greal. (Jelleral Quade. a" out·
Blandillg C/erman autlwr on curial 'WUrJare. ducribu i,l the Jollowi"g article. ,wiU".
dpeciaU" lor "TM X.tlh C~l4ury." Ihe many diJferell1 pho.•es oj thia heroic lII,rll!1t1{e.
whic:1l. i.. u"lib a"ylhing the u:o,./d Ita. ever BUll ill the field of lI'ur.-K ..\I.
HIDDEN LAND
THAT which gives the war on theeastern front its stamp is the vast-
ness of the spaces in which it is
being fought and the limited knowledge
the world had of these regions. What
was known were the areas which the
Soviet Union had occupied in 1939 (the
Baltic States and eastern Poland). But
even in com~n to European RU88ia
alone. these areas were only a narrow
strip. What lay behind had been
glimpsed by few foreigners 8ince 1919.
The Soviets had hermetically sealed their
country and had also managed with
expert skill to hide the development of
their armed forces and their armament
industry from foreign eyes.
Thus this war theater presented the
German armed forces, including the Ger-
man Air Force, with many a new task,
as well as problems which it had not
been necessary to solve either in Poland,
Norway, Fran(,'C, or the Balkans.
The main purposes of the Luftwafte
were naturally the same in the war
against the Soviets as they had been in
the other war theaters of Europe: to gain
the superiority of the air, and directly
and 'indirectly to 8Upport the Army and
--over the sea-the Navy. But dietance
and terrain, as well as a bitterly and
fanatically fighting enemy who was, also
in the air. numerically very strong, de-
manded the utmost in sacrifice and the
highest devotion to duty from every
single man in the German Luftwaffe.
EXTRAORDIXARY FIOURES
In all the other theaters of war, our
pursuit and fighter squadrons had suc-
ceeded in a comparativcly short time in
gaining air superiority. On the eastern
front it had constantly to be fought for
anew in violent battles at the centers of
operation. The numbers of enemy planes
destroyed speak for themselves. On the
first day of war, June 22, 1941, the figure
was 1,811 planes, a figure which at that
time seemed incredibly high to us. Dur-
ing the first week of uttack, the number
rose to .,107; by August 12 it was 11,250;
by December 10, more than 16,000; ~d
by now the number of Soviet planes shot
down in air battles a·nd by antiairol1J.ft.
artillery as well as destroyed on the
ground has grown to well over 25,000. .
However, more than by theee figures,
the absolute superiority of the German
Air Force is proved by the fact that the:
extremely high lossee of the enemy' are
contrasted by surprisingly low 10ll8e8:on
our own side. Thanke to the excenent
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work of its command, the German Air
Force was able, in spite of frequent local
inferiority in numbers, to gain the upper
hand wherever the main thrusts of the
Army necessitated the obtaining of air
superiority above the area of attack.
Fighter and Stuka squadrons destroyed
the Soviet airfields in the vicinity of our
areas of attack, while our pursuit squad-
rons, excellently supported by anti-
aircraft artillery, cleared the air of the
enemy.
The same squadrons have also in in-
numerable cases aasisted t~e Army in
attack and in defensive fighting on the
battlefields themselves. They took part
in the very early fighting while the
border defeD8C8 were being penetrated.
Then they assisted the spearheads of the
armored units thrusting swiftly and deeply
into enemy territory and contributed
towards quickly remo,ring strong enemy
resistance. Their bombs and the fire
from their cannons and machine guns
struck at enemy units held in reserve and
at concentrations of armored cars; they
silenced batteries and destroyed pillboxes
and fortifications. The antiaircraft artil-
lery earned special merit in support of
the Army. Even the heaviest Soviet
tanks have succumbed to the power of
penetration of its excellently shooting
guns. Far beyond its original task of
fighting enemy planes, the antiaircraft
artillery has proved itself a first-class,
rough-and-ready, indispensable front-line
force.
AIDING THE ARMY
While the heavy defensive fighting was
raging on the eastern front during the
exceptionally cold winter of 194]/42, the
Air Force achieved outstanding SUCCC88C8
in supporting the Army. When ice- and
snowbound tracks and roads made it
almost impossible to bring up reserves
rapidly to threatened sectors, squad-
IOns of the Luftwaffe, which were in-
dependent of rail and road communica-
tions; were often the only means of
giving aid in time. They did this by
attaob with bombs and machine guns
and through, ~heir air-transport units
which brought fresh troope, ammunition,
and food supplies to the front and carried
back wounded, often enough under the
worst poesible weather conditions. On
several occasions they succeeded in sup-
plying by air cut-off and completely
encircled Army units until the latter
could be relieved. In the winter months
especially, the Luftwafft' proved itself an
excellent, swift" hard-hitting, and mobile
reserve in the hands of tho High Com-
mand.
The Air Force could also give valuable
aid to the Army by direct means. The
further our attack advanced toward the
east, the more wide-meshod became
the network of railways and roads.
Here a rich and profitable field of activity
offered itself to our planes. Railway
junctions and railway stations behind the
Soviet front were set on fire by our
bombs, locomotives and trains were de-
stroyed and derailed, ammunition and
fuel trains blasted, and rails were torn
up and made useless by countless direct
hits. The traffic congestion resulting
from these attacks disorganized the Soviet
supply system, impeded the bringing up
of men, arms, ammunition. and food
supplies, destroyed valuable war ma-
terial' and in this way relieved our front-.
Similar successes we"rc achieved by air
attacks on the few really pract.ioable and
for that reason particularly crowded
highways.
PLANES WIN A BATTLE
The successful actions against enemy
shipping on the Black Sea and the Cas-
pian, t,he Baltic, and the Arctic Ocean,
serve the same purpose. As a classic
example of indirect support of tho Arm)',
we mention the destruction of the large
Anglo-American convoy in the Arctic
at the end of June 1942. Bv far t.he
greater part of the vessels \\'(>r~ sunk by
the Luftwaffe. From cargo lists cap-
tured, we know that the destruotion of
this convoy entailed material losses for
the enemy whioh for us represent the
SUC0C88 of winning a huge battle, a battle
in which not a single Gennan soldier of
t·be Army had to use his rifie or machine
gun, in which not a singl~ Ulell was fired
or a single tank moved, a' battle in which
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the Army lost not a single soldier, eithe.r
dead, wounded, or taken prisoner. The
arms, tanks, planes, and ammunition
8Unk in the Arctic have ceased for all
t,ime to threaten German soldiers.
The reconnoitering squadrons of the
Air Force have aleo an honorable share
in the SUcee88e8 which the German armed
forces have 80 far won on the c88tem
front. Orientation is made difficult here
by inadequate maps, a monotonous ter-
rain that, according to western European
ideu, is hard to survey, and endless
forene hose outlines usually do not
eYeD coincide with the map. Rural
roads and rivers change their course with
the'se&80ns and according to the weather,
EYES OJ' THE ARMY
In spite of all these difficulties, air
reconnaissance units have done excellent
work. It is to their special l'.redit that
through them the Army command W88
always quickly informed about the course
of the front and the goals reached by our
troops. This was all the more important
1iDce, during the great Keuel battles,
entire Army corps had often to fight for
daY' with their front to the
W(l6t in order to cut off. the
surrounded Soviet armies.
throoP constant observation
of the railway and road network
hundreds of miles into enemy
~rritory, they were able to
bring back valuable reports con-
ceming troop movements, preparations
for attack, etc.
Like the crews of the flying units, the
men of the ground crews, the airplane
mechanics and the host of men needed
for attendance a,nd care, have done their
difficuJt duty in burning heat and icy
cold.
The air signal corps has been respon-
sible for maintaining connections be-
tween command and troops, in spite of
the enormous distances to be bridged.
Finally, the supply unit.s of the Air
Force have brought up, even under the
most difficuJt road conditions, all the
thousands of things on which a technical
force like the Luftwaffe is dependent.·
]n the winter months especially, they
have often made possible that which
seemed absolutely impossible. They have
seen to it that everything that W88
actually needed by the Luftwaffe was
really there, and that the planes were
always able to st.art.
The German Air Force can look back
with pride on its achievements during
the eighteen months of war
on the eastern front. The share
it has had in the successe.s
of the German armed forces
on this thea.ter of war, too,
has already become a part of
history. The Luftwaffe will
continue to do its duty.
.poD conclusion of the Franco-Prusaian War oi 1870, Bismarck
. went to Frankfort to participate in the peace negotiations there.
Be .... wearing civilian clothetl when he anived at the hotel. The
head wait«. who waa accustomed to seeing the ChanceUor in uniform,
~ hie aurpri8e and said: "We almoet did not recognize
.,our Ezoellency'" Bismarck laughed and replled: "Then you would
have had the MIlle trouble aa the French, for ther did not know
who we reaDy were until we put on our uniforms!'
" .
.: ..:
SUBMARINES IN MODERN WAR
By REAR ADMIRAL LUTZOW
TAere i8 olle phase in thi8 n'Clr o'~ u'Mch tile leaders oj the Allied camp hQl'e
not d'il/played opti7lli,," ill rerent monlhs. 0" the cOlltmry, Ihey ha·r;e eo,u,i8lelllly
Nlrel/8ed th~ 11 itherto tI'Il81,rnIOltllt,,,d diffiell11iM facing Ihem in t1li8 pha8e. 1J'e refer
10 the t"'Rllcu',~ft,1 battle oj the Alliu "!/fliIl8t Ucrmun ",wlllariIlU.
111 the follolOillO article, speciall!/ 1lIriUeil lor "The X Xt" Celli'''!!,'' Admiral
Lutzow. ",e oall//"",Iillg Oerman. llaL",1 commen./ator, prese,ulI hill ideall on the subject.
-K.M,
THE aim of naval waJiare has alwaysbeen to gain supremacy over mari-time connections. To keep these
open for oneself and to close them for
the enemy-that was the object of the
struggle. In former centlU'ies the deci-
sions in such naval wars were always
brought about in naval battles fought by
fleets of warships. The victor of these
battles could send out his own merchant
ships and drive those of the enemy off
the seas. Consequentl~', the proportionate
strength of the various navies a~ the
ooginning of a war had an im~ant
bearing on such decisions. And since,
in contrast to the land, the open seas
know no obstacles of terrain, a com-
parison of the numbers of warships ready
for action was a good standard on which
t.() base an estimate of the ratio of strength.
These well-founded views on naval
warfare were suddenly blown sky-high
by the sinking of the three British armored
cruisers Hogue, Crusy, and Abouk'ir by a
German submarine, commanded by Otto
Weddigen, on SepteJ~l~r 12, 19)4. For
this proved with one st.roke tha,t the
submarine was able to pierc,e the naval
snpremacy of even the strongest battle
fleet. Without regard for the enemy's
numerioal superiority, the submarine
could injure his maritime communications
and their protection, indeed, even destroy
them, without, on the other hand, being
able to ensure its own side's maritime
connections.
The fact that., as a result of these
expel'iences, the German V-boat attacks
were directed from 1915 onwards, not so
lUuch against the warships of the 'enemy,
as against his merchant fleets w$.':l brq~ght
about by the hunger blockade im~
upon Germany by Great BJ.'italn:, In
order to carry out this blockade, the
British Admiralty kept back its Navy
and carefully avoided any battle and, as
far as possible, any contact with V~boats.
We replied to the hunger blockade with
a counterblockade by V -boats. " From
HH4 to 1918, Britain employed about three
thousand vessels against the V-boats and
fought them with depth ~harge~" ,jnin,e;
nets, captive balloolls, airships, hydro-
planes, and V-boat traps. 'By 'the, ill-
trodu<,tion of the convoy systeni'in' 1917,
she banished the danger to such a degree
that the revolution in Germany prevented
the V-boat war from taking full effect.
In the autumn of 1918 there were 436
Gel'Ulan submarines under construction.
(This figure is the large8t yet revealed
in this r.o.nnution and, romin.g as it
dou Innn an emin.en/, .autlwrity, 8eems to
us to be of sen.saii01lal significance. If, by
the end of the first World War, Germany,
cut of! from aU 8O'Urcu 01 '!Upply and
lacking a clear Mval policy, was working
on 436 U-boats, one can imagine what must
be going on on the wluJ,rvu of 'all Europe
tada,y, when tlte leaders of Germany are
fully awaJ.:e to the paramount importance
of submarine warfa.rt.-The Editor.)
